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CONTRACTING OUT OF ARTICLE 2:
MINIMIZING THE OBLIGATION OF
PERFORMANCE & LIABILITY FOR BREACH
Sarah Howard Jenkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Census Bureau reports that in 2005, 1.67 trillion
dollars in goods were imported to the United States and 904 billion
dollars in goods were exported.' These statistics corroborate the
reported expansion of goods and services exported in 2005 by
226,000 small businesses. 2 Approximately seventy-five percent of
all goods traded in 2005 were shipped to or from fifteen top
countries.3  Of this seventy-five percent, fifty-two percent were
destined for or originated from countries that are signatories to the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
Unless otherwise agreed, the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods governed these transactions.4 A seller
confronted with an expanding global market may desire to define its
business risk and increase efficiency by using the same standard
terms in both its domestic and international contracts.
This article addresses the seller's ability to opt-out of the
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1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS, TOP TRADING PARTNERS-TOTAL
TRADE, EXPORTS, IMPORTS, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top
/top0512.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2006).
2. Renuka Rayasam, Hemmed in No Longer, This Firm Sews Up a Global Brand, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 31, 2006, at 50.
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1.
4. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 1,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 60 [hereinafter CISG].
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Uniform Commercial Code5 in domestic transactions. Indeed, the
goal of this article is to ascertain the extent to which a seller may
"push the envelope" in minimizing: (1) its obligation of performance,
(2) the buyer's right to complain regarding the quality of the seller's
performance, and (3) the seller's responsibility for failing to perform
as obligated. This article is not an endorsement of such conduct but
rather an exercise to define the parameters imposed by the UCC.
First, this article addresses the extent to which parties may freely
contract out of Article 2. Second, it identifies the methods available
for minimizing a seller's obligation of performance, a buyer's right
to complain regarding the quality of a seller's performance, and a
seller's responsibility for failing to perform. Finally, this article
assesses, as part of the discussion, whether UCC norms and policing
tools constrain a seller to meet minimum UCC standards.
II. FREEDOM OF CONTRACTING
UCC section 1-302 of Revised Article 1 propounds a broad
public policy of freedom of contracting between parties to
transactions subject to the UCC.6 Indeed, Official Comment 2 to this
section suggests that parties may opt-out of the UCC. In pertinent
part, it provides:
An agreement that varies the effect of provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code may do so by stating the rules
that will govern in lieu of the provisions varied.
Alternatively, the parties may vary the effect of such
provisions by stating their relationship will be governed by
recognized bodies of rules or principles applicable to
commercial transactions. Such bodies of rules or principles
may include, for example, those that are promulgated by
intergovernmental authorities such as UNCITRAL or
Unidroit (see, e.g., Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts), or non-legal codes such as trade
codes.7
5. The focus of this article, unless otherwise indicated, is unamended Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code). The unamended article will be cited as U.C.C. § 2-
xxx (2000); the amended version of Article 2 will be cited as U.C.C. § 2-xxx (2003). Revised
Article 1 will be cited as U.C.C. § 1-xxx (2001).
6. See U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001).
7. Id. § 1-302 cmt. 2.
Fall 2006] CONRACTING OUT OF ARTICLE 2
Thus, under Revised Article 1, parties to a transaction within the
scope of Article 2 may opt-out of Article 2's "variable" provisions
but remain subject to its mandatory provisions. 8  Hence, the broad
policy of freedom of contracting in the Code is not an absolute one.
This right to vary the effect or consequences of the Code's
standards is "subject to specific exceptions," some expressed, some
implied. 9 Sections of the Code may be construed as mandatory and
not subject to variance because a provision expressly prohibits
variance; construction of the language suggests that the section is
mandatory rather than discretionary; or some general public policy
supports a conclusion that a provision is a mandatory one.' 0 This
right to vary terms is fraught with complexities if the limits
suggested by section 1-302, Comment 2 are pursued.
Consider a seller whose burgeoning sales increasingly involve
trade with international parties. The seller may desire the efficiency
of having the same terms in both its domestic and international
8. Id. § 1-302.
9. Id. § 1-302 cmt. 1.
10. The following provisions should be construed as mandatory. 1) Statute of Frauds-UCC
§ 2-201 Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
2) The Parol Evidence Rule-UCC § 2-202 Final Written Expression in a Record: Parol or
Extrinsic Evidence. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 3) UCC § 2-302
Unconscionable Contract or Clause. Section 2-302 provides a substantive tool designed to
encourage uniformity in policing bargains to prevent oppression and unfair surprise; parties may
not, by agreement, negate the applicability of the provision. 4) UCC § 2-318 Third Party
Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied. Each of the statutory alternatives that extend the
rights of express and implied warranties to third parties expressly prohibits the exclusion or
limitation of a seller's liability to third parties for warranties made by the seller to its buyer. 5)
UCC § 2-603 Merchant Buyer's Duties as to Rightfully Rejected Goods. Here, the language of
the section is mandatory rather than discretionary and the duty to follow the seller's instructions
or to resell when none are given is imposed as a matter of good faith and commercial necessity.
6) Duty to Mitigate Damages-UCC § 2-715 (2)(a). The section restates a general public policy
of a buyer's duty to mitigate damages. See U.C.C. § 2-715 cmt. 2 (2000); U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 1-
106 cmt. 1, 1-305 cmt. 1 (2001) (common law duty to mitigate damages); see also U.C.C. § 2-
803(b) (Draft, March 1999) (mitigation requirements bar aggrieved parties to transactions from
recovering the portion of losses resulting from breach of contracts that could have been avoided
by "reasonable measures under the circumstances"). 7) UCC § 2-718 Liquidation or Limitation
of Damages; Deposits. Agreements liquidating damages must be reasonable. 8) UCC § 2-719
Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy. An agreement must provide a "fair quantum"
of a remedy and the limitation of consequential damages cannot be unconscionable. 9) UCC § 2-
725 Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale. The statutory provision defining a default rule
for the statute of limitations expressly limits variation to not less that one year and not more than
four years.
In addition to these mandatory sections, several sections are partially mandatory in
character. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 2-607(1), (4) (2000).
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deals.' 1 With this goal in mind, consider an attempt by the seller in a
transaction with a domestic buyer to opt-out of Article 2 and select
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
12
to govern their relationship as suggested by Comment 2 to Revised
UCC section 1-302. The UNIDROIT Principles contain neither a
statute of frauds1 3 nor a parol evidence rule.14 Yet, the parties remain
subject to UCC sections 2-201 and 2-202. This result is effectuated
by the strong public policy rationale for both rules, rather than an
express prohibition in either statutory provision. 15
The general public policy goals of preventing perjury and fraud
while promoting certainty, deliberateness, and caution support a
conclusion that section 2-201, the Statute of Frauds, is mandatory
despite the absence of express language in the section.
16
Commentary in both Revised Article 1 and Amended Article 2
reinforce this conclusion.1 7  Likewise, Article 2's Parol Evidence
Rule is a substantive rule governing the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence to establish that a term or terms omitted from the record
were agreed to and should be enforced as part of the agreement.
18
The rule limits the character of evidence that the fact finder may
consider in determining the enforceable circle of assent between the
11. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
12. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (UNIDROIT 1994)
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
13. Id. art. 1.2.
14. See id. art. 4.3.
15. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2-202 (2000); infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
16. UCC section 2-201 reads as follows:
2-201 Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his
authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly
states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
U.C.C. § 2-201 (2000). See generally JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS § 19.1 (5th ed. 2003) (describing the public policy supporting the statute of frauds
and also impliedly recognizing the statute of frauds as a mandatory provision).
17. See U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2001); U.C.C. § 2-201 cmts. 1, 4 (2003) (stating "three
definite and invariable requirements" for a sufficient memorandum and the effect of a failure to
satisfy the provision (emphasis added)).
18. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2000).
404
CONRA CTING OUT OF ARTICLE 2
parties. 19 The rule states a general public policy goal of giving
deference to a record intended by the parties as a final expression of
some or all of their agreement.20  Terms upon which confirmatory
memoranda agree and a record determined by the courts to be
intended as a final expression are subject to the rule's protection.
2 1
A statement that the Parol Evidence Rule shall not be applied to a
record or a general attempt at opting out of the Code is ineffective
for circumscribing the court's ability to apply prevailing analysis to
the record. Parties must comply with the principles of the Parol
Evidence Rule, such as the use or omission of a merger clause, to
drive the court's analysis as it seeks to glean the intent of the parties
regarding the effect of the final writing.
22
A. Opting-In the Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods
Could the parties opt-in the Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods 23 by designating the CISG rather than the
UNIDROIT Principles as section 1-302 suggests? 24 Revised section
1-301 grants broad party autonomy to commercial parties in
choosing the applicable law, only limiting their designation to that of
25 . 26a state in domestic transactions. However, the majority of
jurisdictions codifying Revised Article 1 enacted former section 1-
105 as a non-uniform provision rather than Revised Article 1 section
1-301. 27  The non-uniform enactment restricts party designation to
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Telecom Int'l Am. Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 190-92 (2d Cir. 2001).
But see L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., 9 F.3d 561, 569 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the writing was not completely integrated despite the presence of a merger clause).
23. Currently, 67 nations are parties to the treaty, with the treaty entering into force for the
last two parties, Liberia and Paraguay, on October 1, 2006 and February 1, 2007, respectively.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status of the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, http://www.uncitral.org
/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/sale-goods/1 980CISG_status.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2006).
24. See U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (2001).
25. "'State' means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States." Id. § 1-201(38).
26. Id. § 1-301(c)(1).
27. States adopting the non-uniform provision of former Section 1-105 (2000) for their
Choice of Law rule include: ALA. CODE § 7-1-301 (Supp. 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-301
(Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-1-301 (Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 1-301
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the law of a state or nation that has a reasonable relationship to the
transaction.
2 8
Whether the state codified the more restrictive choice of law
provision or the promulgated version, use of the UNIDROIT
Principles for variable default provisions is facilitated by designating
the law of a state in the agreement, such as Alabama, and the
presence of Revised section 1-302 as a part of that state's laws.
29
The same should be true for designating the CISG as the source of
law for all variable provisions. Section 1-302 of Alabama's Code
authorizes the designation of "bodies of rules or principles applicable
to commercial transactions," such as, "those that are promulgated by
intergovernmental authorities such as UNCITRAL .... 30
Certainly, the parties may, in a section by section variance on the
consequences of the default provisions of the Code, create an
agreement that is consistent with the provisions of the CISG.31 But,
whether the shorthand designation of the CISG is effective must be
32resolved. The CISG was promulgated by UNCITRAL. However,
one must ask whether, as positive law in Alabama and nations that
have acceded to the CISG, the CISG is, for a domestic transaction,
something more than a "body of rules" and, therefore, ineligible for
selection under the commentary to Revised section 1-302. 33
At the very least, one might argue that selection of the CISG, by
employing Revised section 1-302 and Comment 2, appears contrary
to the spirit of the promulgated version of Revised section 1-301-
(2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:1-301 (Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-1-301 (Supp.
2006); MINN. STAT. § 336.1-301 (Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-301 (2005); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 1-301 (Supp. 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.1301 (Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. § 55-1-301
(2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-301 (Supp. 2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 1.301
(Vernon Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1A-301 (Supp. 2006).
28. UCC section 1-105(1) reads as follows:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable
relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the
law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and
duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to this state.
U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2000) (current version at UCC § 1-301 (2001)).
29. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
30. ALA. CODE § 7-1-302 cmt. 2.
31. See id.
32. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, G.A.
Res. 35/51, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/51 (Dec. 4, 1980).
33. See U.C.C. § 1-302, cmt. 2 (2001).
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the specific statutory provision governing choice of law. Section 1-
301 limits party autonomy in domestic transactions to designating
the law of a "state." 34  This conclusion, however, is a hasty one.
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, 35 the CISG is the law of every
state in the Union;36 consequently, the spirit of promulgated section
1-301 is not violated.37 Likewise, in those jurisdictions with the non-
uniform codification of section 1-301, 3 the fact that the CISG
addresses goods in cross-border transactions is irrelevant. If the
transaction is reasonably related to the state or nation whose law the
parties designated, as in our hypothetical case of Alabama, the spirit
of section 1-301 is not violated. Indeed, because the CISG is
commercial law governing commercial transactions within its scope
in the State of Alabama, 39 the CISG is more appropriate than
designating the UNIDROIT Principles. Furthermore, the designation
of the CISG as the source of law for variable provisions does not
offend the Code's goals of uniformity and simplicity of commercial
law.40  The parties are free to tailor their agreement, making it
relevant to their needs for terms that otherwise state broad, general
standards of reasonableness.
34. See id. § 1-301.
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
36. See CISG, supra note 4.
37. The United State Supreme court stated:
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has determined that
federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might provide a more
convenient forum-although both might well be true-but because the Constitution
and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the
state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws "the supreme Law of the
Land," and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law
according to their regular modes of procedure. "The laws of the United States are laws
in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the
State laws are.... The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which
constitutes the law of the land for the State...."
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990). See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954) (stating that the interaction
between the federal and state governments is complex, ultimately there is only one system of law
in the United States).
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-1-301 (Supp. 2005).
39. See U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2, 1987).
40. SeeU.C.C.§ 1-103 (2001).
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B. Designating the Law of a Nation in a Domestic Transaction
Consider an attempt by domestic parties to designate the law of
a foreign nation for the variable provisions of Article 2. Suppose
that Buyer, with a business in Nebraska, and Seller, with a business
in Alabama, agree that Nebraska state law will govern their sales
transaction. Both Alabama and Nebraska have codified the non-
uniform version of section 1-301 .4 1 The parties also agree that the
UNIDROIT Principles will govern all variable rights and obligations.
Such an agreement is supported by UCC section 1-302 and its
commentary. 42 The parties further agree that the Ontario Frustrated
Contracts Act43 will apply to their transaction and govern issues of
exemption. This designation, however, may be more than a "body of
rules" and, therefore, ineligible for selection under the commentary
to Revised section 1-302.
Clearly, the parties may draft a provision defining the rights and
obligations of the parties upon the occurrence of a frustrating event,
with the analogous effect to that under the OFCA.44  State law
empowers the parties to vary the terms of default provisions.
4 5
Nevertheless, designating the OFCA, which is a body of rules on
frustrated contracts, may not be as effective as a draft provision
delineating the rights and obligations that are a by-product of the
OFCA. Using the shortcut designation-the OFCA-rather than
stating the consequences of the application of the OFCA, the parties
incur the risk of a domestic court's misconstruction of the effect of
the foreign law. Designating the OFCA in a contract is
comprehensive because it necessarily includes all case law
construing and applying the provision.
More importantly, Comment 2 to the promulgated version of
UCC section 1-301 provides the definition of the permissible scope
of the term "bodies of rules or principles" for section 1-302.46 These
bodies of rules or principles must be promulgated by
intergovernmental organizations such as UNCITRAL or
41. See ALA. CODE § 7-1-301 (Supp. 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 1-301 (Supp. 2005).
42. See U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2. (2001).
43. Frustrated Contracts Act, R.S.O., ch. F.34 (1990) [hereinafter OFCA].
44. See ALA. CODE § 7-1-302; NEB. REV. STAT. § 1-302.
45. ALA. CODE § 7-1-302; NEB. REV. STAT. § 1-302.
46. U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 2 (2001).
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UNIDROIT. 47  The OFCA is not promulgated by an
intergovernmental organization and thus fails to satisfy this
definition. The designation also violates the limited circumscription
on party autonomy in domestic transactions.
In jurisdictions with the more restrictive, non-uniform version of
section 1-301, the OFCA may be designated only if the transaction is
reasonably related to Ontario; otherwise, the designation should be
ruled ineffective. 48 The non-uniform version of UCC section 1-301
states a strong public policy on the designation of law that is
reasonably related to the transaction.49 Unless the transaction bears a
reasonable relationship to Ontario, the court should not apply Ontario
law.50 Likewise, the limitation to party autonomy in the promulgated
version of 1-301 effectively bars the shorthand designation of the
OFCA. Here, the power is limited to the designation of the law of a
state.
Revised section 1-302 states a broad freedom of contracting, but
this freedom is limited to varying the effect of default rules and
establishing standards for measuring the obligations of good faith,
diligence, or reasonableness. A variation of the default rules may be
achieved by stating rules other than the Code which will govern the
contract or by designating "recognized bodies of rules or principles"
to govern the relationship. 51  Recognized bodies of rules and
principles reasonably include references to INCOTERMS, 52 the
UCP,53 and international conventions designed to harmonize diverse
national laws.54
III. CONTRACTING OUT: DRAFTING THE AGREEMENT
A. Hybrid or Mixed Transactions
The prevailing test for the applicability of Article 2 to hybrid
47. Id.
48. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (2000).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (2001).
52. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2000 (2000).
53. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC UNIF. CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (revised ed. 1993).
54. See U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (2001).
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transactions is the "predominate feature" or "purpose" test.55 Courts
use other labels, including "essence of the agreement," when
ascertaining the thrust or purpose of the agreement between the
parties.56 If the predominate feature of the agreement is the goods
component of the transaction, Article 2 and its warranties apply to
the entire obligation of the seller, including the service component.57
Whether the "mix" is goods and services, or goods, intangibles, and
real estate, courts consider the language of the contract and the
intrinsic worth of the goods relative to the contract price.58 If the
"mix" is goods and services, the nature of the supplier's business in
general and, specifically, in the contract in question, becomes
relevant.59
In drafting the agreement, the scrivener can drive the court's
determination by reflecting an intent that the predominate purpose of
the agreement is the provision of a service and not the acquisition of
goods. The following factors are given considerable weight as a
court seeks to determine the "purpose" or "essence" of the
agreement: the title of the agreement as a service or licensing
55. Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 459-60 (4th Cir.
1983) (explaining the predominate feature or purpose test).
56. See generally id.; Proto Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Superior Precast, Inc., No. 99-CV-
2851(NG), 2002 WL 1159593 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2002) (discussing the "main objective
sought to be accomplished by the contracting parties" or the "dominant element of the
agreement" (quoting Hunter's Run Stables, Inc. v. Triple H. Constr. Co., 938 F. Supp. 166, 168
(W.D.N.Y. 1996))).
57. See Besicorp Group, Inc. v. Thermo Electron Corp., 981 F. Supp. 86, 95 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (applying Massachusetts law); Pittsley v. Houser, 875 P.2d 232, 235 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994)
(remanding the case for failure to apply the UCC to a contract for the purchase and installation of
carpet); B & B Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Serv., Inc. v. Haifley, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(CBC) 635, 636 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1978). But see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Cape Cod v. Weston
& Sampson Eng'rs, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 688, 691 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (declining to apply the
UCC to a contract for the design, construction, operation, and completion of a wastewater
treatment facility).
58. See, e.g., Dravo Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 602 F. Supp. 1136, 1140-41 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (holding that under the "essential bulk of the assets to be transferred" test, the parties'
transaction was not one for sale of goods because two assets that represented more than half of
the purchase price for two subsidiaries were (a) the ideas conveyed in drawings and tracings, and
(b) a five-year non-competition agreement); Robertson v. Ceola, 501 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Ark.
1973) (holding that the essence of the agreement to install tile in the owner's home was a personal
services contract despite the $15,000 cost for the tile supplied, the $12 per hour charge for
installation, plus 15% of cost of goods charged by the installer); McFadden v. Imus, 481 N.W.2d
812, 813-14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (employing the "reasonable totality of the circumstances
test" the court held that the UCC did not apply to the sale of an automobile dealership that
included real estate, good will, and hard assets).
59. Coakley & Williams, 706 F.2d at 460.
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agreement; a statement that the purchaser's primary goal or
purpose is not the acquisition of goods but rather the acquisition of
the supplier's expertise and skill as a service provider; 61 an indication
that the agreement is a deviation from the supplier's ordinary course
of business as a seller of goods; and a statement of the total purchase
price without allocating a portion for the value for the goods. 62 By
employing these features, the parties effectively opt-out of Article 2
with the obligation of performance imposed by its warranties.
B. Agreements Within the Scope ofArticle 2
A seller seeking to contract out of Article 2 will have one of
three goals or a combination thereof: (1) minimizing its obligation of
performance; (2) minimizing the buyer's right to complain about the
performance received; or (3) minimizing its responsibility for failing
to deliver goods consistent with its obligation of performance. A
combination of the three is possible under Article 2. Although
domestic jurisprudence does not obligate the seller to negotiate in
good faith, the enforceability of an agreement may be challenged if it
is so imbalanced that it is unconscionable.
63
1. Minimizing the Seller's Obligation of Performance
As a general principle, a seller may minimize its obligation of
performance without violating its duty of good faith and, thus, curtail
60. See, e.g., Saint Anne-Nackawic Pulp Co. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 729,
734 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the title of the agreement and the small percentage of the
purchase price allocated to services drove the determination of the applicability of the UCC to the
transaction); Space Leasing Assocs. v. Atl. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 241 S.E.2d 438, 441 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977) (holding that the title of a subcontract for the construction and installation of a metal roof,
"Contract for Sale and Erection of Dixisteel Building(s)," raised a question of fact of whether the
subject of the transaction was goods).
61. Care Display, Inc. v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 589 P.2d 599, 605 (Kan. 1979) (holding that the
development of an artistic or design concept rather than the actual physical production of a
display booth and the materials to be used in the display booth were the primary concerns during
contract negotiations); Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Chimney Corp., 672 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (App.
Div. 1998) (holding that the four-year statute of limitations of UCC Section 2-725 was applicable
when a clause in the contract provided that "to the extent that the agreement involved the
purchase of services, such services were to be regarded as goods for the purpose of determining
the obligations of the parties").
62. Inhabitants of the City of Saco v. Gen. Elec. Co., 779 F. Supp. 186, 197 (D. Me. 1991)
(the court considered the recital, the fixed fee that did not allocate the price between the
components of the agreements, and the title of the agreement).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981); see also infra notes 80-
81 and accompanying text (discussing unconscionability as a policing tool for Article 2
transactions).
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its obligation of satisfying the standards of performance established
and imposed by Article 2. Indeed, Article 2 provides the mechanism
for such reductions. By employing effective disclaimers of implied
warranties that satisfy the conspicuousness requirement, 64  the
obligation to meet industry standards or those imposed by a course of
dealing is avoided.65 This freedom to contract out of the standards of
performance and privately order the relationship is subject to
regulation by public law. Policing tools such as the doctrine of
unconscionability 66 and the buyer's reasonable expectations are used
to adjust the seller's obligation. Likewise, contract formation
principles control the sudden use of a disclaimer or the repeated use
of a disclaimer in an ongoing contractual relationship based on the
exchange of forms. 6 7 Express warranties are not obviated with the
same ease as implied warranties.
68
a. Express warranties
A seller may use affirmations, descriptions, promises, and
samples or models to induce the buyer's agreement to purchase his
or her wares. Article 2 treats these expressions as express warranties
and obligations of performance when such affirmations, descriptions,
and samples or models are part of the basis of the bargain. 69 This
principle gives effect to the buyer's reasonable expectation as
induced by the seller's conduct. More importantly, express
warranties cannot be disclaimed. 70  Any negation of express
64. Section 1-201 defines conspicuous as a term written, displayed, or presented in a way
that it "ought to be noticed" by a reasonable person. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2001).
65. U.C.C. Section 2-316 reads as follows:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.
U.C.C. § 2-316 (2000).
66. Id. § 2-302; see, e.g., Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 299-303 (6th Cir.
1985) (questioned on other grounds).
67. See, e.g., Trans-Aire Int'l v. N. Adhesive Co., 882 F.2d 1254, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989);
Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack, Co., 794 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1986); Tuck Industries
v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 542 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (App. Div. 1989); Se. Adhesive Co. v.
Funder Am., Inc., 366 S.E.2d 505, 507 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
68. U.C.C. § 2-316.
69. Id. § 2-313.
70. See id. § 2-313 cmt. 1; id. § 2-316(1).
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warranties must be construed, if reasonable, as consistent with the
express warranty; if it is not reasonable to do so, the negation fails.
71
A seller may not induce a bargain and create a reasonable
expectation that the goods will conform to the description or sample
and then disclaim the obligation.72  Notwithstanding the statutory
limitation on disclaiming an express warranty, a seller may achieve
such a result through the use of a merger clause in the final
agreement.
Assume the seller makes a statement regarding the quality of the
goods with the expectation of including a merger clause in the
agreement. The inclusion of a merger clause in the subsequent
written agreement bars the admission of evidence of prior oral or
prior written express warranties, 73 negating the seller's obligation to
perform consistent with the statements, affirmations, descriptions,
promises, and samples or models that it used to induce the
transaction. Article 2's prohibition on disclaiming express
warranties is subject to the Parol Evidence Rule, 74 one of the
mandatory rules of Article 2. If evidence of the express warranty is
inadmissible, the buyer cannot prove the obligation and it is not,
therefore, a part of the contract. Some courts avoid this effect by
holding that, although the written agreement contains the merger
clause, (1) it is not "intended" by both parties as a final expression,
76
71. Id. § 2-316(1).
72. Id. § 2-316cmt. 1.
73. U.C.C. Section 2-202, the Parol Evidence Rule, reads as follows:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which
are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented (a) by course of performance, course of dealing, or
usage of trade (Section 1-303); and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
Id. § 2-202.
74. Id. § 2-316(l).
75. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Husky Spray Serv., Inc. v. Patzer, 471 N.W.2d 146, 148-52 (S.D. 1991)
(applying North Dakota law and holding that "where the express representations made by seller
are claimed to be inconsistent with the form language of the contract, parol evidence may be
admitted to determine whether the written contract is a final expression of the parties' agreement
and whether the warranty, or disclaimer thereof, was part of the bargain explicitly negotiated
between the parties"); O'Neil v. Int'l Harvester Co., 575 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that oral express warranties and seller's conduct after the sale raised a material issue of
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(2) the merger clause is unconscionable, 77 or (3) the seller's conduct
is fraudulent, thereby nullifying the merger clause's bar on the
admission of evidence of fraud as a recognized exception to the Parol
78Evidence Rule. Despite these alternatives, merger clauses and
disclaimers have been upheld even in consumer transactions.79
To dissuade lessors from engaging in such conduct, Article 2A
specifically addresses this type of duplicitous conduct in consumer
transactions. The comment to section 2A-108(2) 80 provides that
"[t]o make a statement to induce the consumer to lease the goods, in
the expectation of invoking an integration clause in the lease to
exclude the statement's admissibility in a subsequent dispute, may be
unconscionable."
8 1
b. Warranties offuture performance
A seller effectively limits its obligation of performance when it
eschews making express warranties, especially express warranties of
whether the writing was intended as a final expression); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 214 (1989) (explaining that an agreement or negotiation prior to or
contemporaneous with the adoption of the writing is admissible to establish that an agreement is
not integrated or that it is only partially integrated).
77. Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 671 (1982) (holding that an
inconspicuous merger clause provided little evidence of the parties' intent and was
unconscionable; the merger clause did not bar admission of the express oral warranties).
78. See, e.g., Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Savage, 570 So.2d 306, 307-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that where buyer alleged fraudulent inducement, parol evidence rule did not
bar admission of affirmations that induced the sale containing an "as is" warranty). But see
Sunset Pointe at Silver Lakes Assocs. v. Vargas, 881 So.2d 12, 13-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(limiting, in a nongoods setting, Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, 570 So.2d 306, to the introduction of
evidence that does not contradict the writing).
79. See, e.g., Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 406 S.W.2d 142, 143-44 (Ark. 1966) (holding
that buyer's testimony that seller made an oral warranty of repair before the parties signed a
writing with a merger clause was inadmissible because the testimony contradicted the writing);
Avery v. Aladdin Prod. Div., Nat'l Serv. Indus., 196 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)
(holding that parol evidence establishing an oral warranty of "good condition" was inadmissible
because it contradicted the writing that disclaimed all warranties and contained a statement that
no representations exist beyond those in the writing; the court firther held that the writing was
not unconscionable).
80. U.C.C. section 2A-108(2) reads as follows:
With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of law finds that a lease
contract or any clause of a lease contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct
or that unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a
lease contract, the court may grant appropriate relief.
U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (2000).
81. Id. § 2A-108 official cmt. (emphasis added); accord U.C.C. § 2A-108 official cmt.
(2003).
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future performance. Without a warranty of future performance, an
action accrues for a breach of warranty upon tender of delivery.
82
Even though a defect may be latent, a breach of warranty occurs at
tender of delivery, including any installation, and the statute of
limitations commences to run.83 In such cases the goods are only
warranted to conform to express warranties at tender of delivery, not
84beyond. The discovery rule is inapplicable and the statute of
limitations commences at delivery without the necessity of the
buyer's discovery of the defect.
85
A seller may effectively erode a buyer's right to complain about
the quality of performance by omitting a warranty of future
performance and reducing the statute of limitations to the permissible
one year.86 However, attempted repairs after delivery and before the
lapse of the limitation period may operate as "repair estoppel" as
recognized in several jurisdictions. 87 "Repair estoppel" is employed
by jurisdictions to toll or arrest the running of the statute of
limitations to protect buyers if a seller engages in affirmative acts to
defeat the buyer's cause of action.
88
i. Creating a warranty of future performance
Warranties of future performance expressly warrant that the
goods will perform or retain specified qualities for a stated period of
time. 89 Language such as "the goods will be free from defects in
materials and workmanship for a period of the earlier of 50,000 miles
or 5 years" creates a warranty of future performance. When the
seller creates a warranty of future performance, accrual of the
82. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (2000).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 2-725(1).
87. Agristor Leasing v. Kramer, 640 F. Supp. 187, 190-91 (D. Min. 1986) (applying
Minnesota law and holding that the buyer failed to establish a representation to serve as a basis of
an estoppel for tolling the statute of limitations); Ranker v. Skyline Corp, 493 A.2d 706, 709 (Pa.
Super. 1985) (recognizing that repair estoppel will toll the statute of limitations if the seller has
attempted to repair a defect and made "a representation that the repairs have cured or will cure the
defect" and holding that the doctrine was not satisfied in this case); see also Rose City Paper Box,
Inc. v. Egenolf Graphic Mach. Int'l Inc., 827 F. Supp. 646, 650 (D. Or. 1993) (addressing the use
of equitable estoppel to bar the assertion of the statute of limitations as a defense).
88. Id.
89. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (2000).
Fall 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:401
buyer's cause of action awaits discovery of the breach. 90 Also, the
statute of limitations commences to run when the breach is or should
have been discovered. 91 Because statements constituting warranties
of future performance are strictly construed, ambiguous language
such as "years of trouble free boating" 92 and the "wood is deep-
treated to permanently protect against rot"93 are not warranties of
future performance. 94  Although imprecise, a statement by a seller
that its product would "out-last the product previously used to treat
[the buyer's] millwork," a period of twenty-six years, was held by
the Eighth Circuit to create a question of fact for the jury.
95
Article 2A's accrual provision is distinguishable. 96  It employs
the more lenient discovery rule of tort law rather than the stringent
97rule codified in unamended Article 2. 9  In a lease transaction, an
action accrues for breach of warranty when the act or omission that is
the basis for the breach is or should have been discovered. 98  No
warranty of future performance is required to suspend the running of
the statute of limitations until discovery; a lessee is protected from
the running of the statute of limitations before the discovery of the
lessor's breach. 99
Article 2A's discovery rule is justified by more than a desire for
leniency by its drafters. The contractual relationship between the
lessor and lessee is distinguishable from that of the buyer and the
90. Id. § 2-725(2).
91. Id.
92. Sherman v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 783, 791 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
93. Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., 652 N.W.2d 806, 814 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
94. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 823 (8th Cir.
1983) (applying Missouri law which requires an unambiguous indication that the goods are
warranted for a specified period of time and finding an express warranty of future performance);
Seizer, 652 N.W.2d at 814 (holding that vague language will not create a warranty of future
performance).
95. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., 223 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying
Minnesota law).
96. UCC Section 2A-506(2) states that "[a] cause of action for default accrues when the act
or omission on which the default or breach of warranty is based is or should have been discovered
by the aggrieved party, or when the default occurs, whichever is later." U.C.C. § 2A-506(2)
(2000).
97. Id. § 2A-506(2) official cmt.; see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9 (4th ed. 1995) (distinguishing the applicable accrual of the
statute of limitations for sales transactions and tort actions).
98. U.C.C. § 2A-506(2).
99. Id.
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seller. Similarly, the position of the lessee vis-a-vis the goods is very
different from that of the buyer. Parties to a lease transaction have
an on-going relationship for the lease term and may resolve
malfunctions as a process of the on-going relationship. The lessor's
residuary interest in the goods warrants a continuing dialogue with
the lessee. In recognition of the on-going relationship, and unlike
section 2-725, section 2A-506 permits the extension of the statute of
limitations beyond the four-year default period.'00 Unlike the buyer
who acquires title to the goods, the lessee has no right to sell the
goods and repurchase substitute goods when those tendered fail to
satisfy its needs. Unless the nonconformity substantially impairs the
value of the goods to the lessee, no right of revocation of its
acceptance is available.'
0 1
Article 2's stringent non-discovery rule was adopted to
implement the general public policy of encouraging immediate
litigation within a period that some argue is consistent with the
general record retention practices of commercial parties. 10 2  The
2003 Amendments to Article 2 maintain the previously established
policy goal but with some increased leniency. The amended Statute
of Limitations maintains the four-year default rule without granting
parties the ability to extend it but adds a one-year discovery rule.'
0 3
A buyer must sue for breach of warranty within four years of tender
of delivery, including installation, or within one year after the breach
was or should have been discovered, but not beyond five years after
the action otherwise accrues.l°4
Consider the following illustration of the effect of the
amendment to section 2-725. The Seller makes an express warranty
regarding the quality of the goods. The Seller delivers the goods on
March 15, 2002. The warranty was not a warranty of future
performance and, therefore, the action accrues on March 15, 2002.
The Buyer discovers the defect, or should have discovered the defect,
on March 18, 2006.
100. Id. § 2A-506(1) official cmt. This section "does not incorporate the limitation found in
Section 2-725(1) prohibiting the parties form extending the period of limitation." Id. Purposes.
101. Id. § 2A-517(1).
102. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FRED MILLER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2A-
506 (2000); U.C.C. § 2-725 official cmt. (2000).
103. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2003).
104. See id.; id. § 2-725(3).
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Here, the Buyer's action is time barred under both the general
and discovery provisions of amended Article 2, unless the action is
commenced on or before March 15, 2007. Under the general
provision, the action is time barred on March 15, 2006, four years
after tender of delivery and accrual of the action. Although the buyer
is given a year from the date that the breach is or should have been
discovered, March 18, 2007, the discovery period cannot exceed five
years from the accrual of the action or March 15, 2007. Inclusion of
the discovery rule period in the statute prevents the inadvertent loss
of the right to sue because of time spent in the fourth year
investigating the malfunction, providing the seller with notice,
permitting repairs, and engaging in negotiations. The amendment is
a reasonable attempt to facilitate good faith resolution by the parties
without the need for the buyer to commence an action to avoid the
loss of its rights.
The amendment to Article 2 also permits parties to reduce the
statutory period to not less than one year.10 5 If the parties reduce the
limitations period to three years without referencing the one-year
discovery period, is the discovery period lost? The answer should be
yes. In the absence of an agreement between the parties to include a
discovery period, any variance of the default rule should completely
abrogate, rather than partially abrogate, the four-year/one-year
discovery provision. Maintaining the discovery portion of the
default rule'0 6 defeats the goal of the parties in reducing the period
for which the seller remains obligated. By agreement, the parties
might substitute an absolute four-year limitations period and
eliminate the one-year discovery rule that is a part of the default
provision, or create a general two-year limitations period with a one-
year discovery rule. The Code's general public policy of freedom of
contracting supports this flexibility.
c. Unconscionability: policing seller's attempts
to minimize its obligation ofperformance
Both Article 2 and the Restatement authorize courts to employ
the doctrine of unconscionability to police oppressive and unfair
105. Id. § 2-725(1).
106. Id. (stating that the default discovery period is "one year after the breach was or should
have been discovered, but no longer than five years after the right of action accrued").
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surprise in contractual relationships.' °7  Prevailing authority
recognizes two components of the doctrine, procedural and
substantive unconscionability. 0 8 Both must be present before a term
or terms may be held unenforceable. 0 9 Procedural unconscionability
controls the nature and quality of the buyer's assent to the terms of
the agreement. 1 ° Assent must not be extracted through oppression,
the absence of meaningful choice, the absence of the opportunity to
read and understand the terms, or in the presence of unequal
bargaining strength.1 1 Substantive unconscionability assays the
fairness of the terms that are unduly favorable to one party or unduly
harsh to the other in light of existing public policy.
112
The doctrine of unconscionability is generally thought to be
unavailable to police transactions between commercial parties
because of the need to establish both procedural unfairness,
unfairness in the bargaining process, and substantive unfairness."
3
Although the evidence of procedural unfairness may in fact be slight
or non-existent, courts deviate from this general rule and apply the
doctrine of unconscionability in a commercial context when
addressing a case that involves substantively egregious terms. 114 In
these cases, the terms are more than harsh and, indeed, rob one party
of rights that reflect a significant public policy in our jurisprudence
107. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
108. See, e.g., Rite Color Chem. Co., Inc. v. Velvet Textile Co., Inc., 411 S.E.2d 645, 650
(1992) (upholding the trial court's finding of the absence of substantive unconscionability and
impliedly recognizing that a finding of unconscionability is impossible without this element);
Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 434 N.E.2d 943, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing the two-
prong test); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 n.13 (Mass. 1980) (identifying
the two prongs of the unconscionability test).
109. See Hahn, 434 N.E.2d at 951; Zapatha, 408 N.E.2d at 1377 n. 13.
110. See, e.g., Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 300-01 (6th Cir. 1985) (questioned
on other grounds).
111. See generally Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(recognizing extremely one-sided contract terms may be unconscionable); Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.D.C. 1965) (holding contract should not be enforced
when unconscionability exists at time contract is formed); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133
(Me. 2005) (discussing unconscionability of arbitration clauses).
112. See, e.g., Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 848 (Ct. App. 1991); Nw.
Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); PacTel
Fin. v. D.C. Marine Serv. Corp., 518 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318-19 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1987).
113. See Byrd Motor Lines, Inc. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 304 S.E.2d 773, 776-77
(N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (stating the general view that a finding of an unconscionable limited remedy
is rare for commercial parties because the relationship is unlikely to be one-sided).
114. See infra note 115.
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such as the right to an effective day in court, or the right to a fair
adjudication of the rights of the parties." 5  When such rights are
abrogated, the seller's limitation of its obligation of performance
may be held ineffective."
6
C. Minimizing the Right to Complain
Regarding the Seller's Performance
Article 2 not only establishes standards for the seller's
performance, but it also provides several mechanisms for the buyer
to "complain" if the seller fails to meet the standards imposed either
by law, such as the implied warranties,' or by the express
warranties" 8 contained in the agreement. However, this right and
opportunity to complain may not only be minimized contractually
but also effectively abrogated.
A buyer's first opportunity to object to the quality of the goods
is after an inspection of the goods. The buyer may "complain" by
making a grumbling statement, or by rejecting the goods 119 or by
demanding an adequate assurance of performance. 120  This right to
inspect the goods, unless the parties otherwise agree, is exercisable
before payment and acceptance of the goods. 12 1  Getting payment
before inspection can be achieved under current Article 2 through the
use of a shipping term that requires either payment against
documents122 or payment upon delivery without inspection.' 23  The
115. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176-77 (Cal. 1981) (involving
arbitration clauses in a non-Code case between sophisticated business parties-absence of fair
adjudication); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124 (Ct. App. 1982)
(involving a contract "between an enormous diversified corporation (FMC) and a relatively small
but experienced farming company (A & M)"); Constr. Assocs. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 446
N.W.2d 237, 244 (N.D. 1989) (finding unconscionability when buyer, a small construction firm,
entered into a contract that lacked negotiation, had terms that created an unfair surprise on buyer,
and provided for a limited remedy at delivery that failed of its essential purpose); First Fed. Fin.
Serv. v. Derrington's Chevron, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 144, 147-48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
a Wisconsin forum selection clause was unconscionable in a finance lease between California gas
station owners with thirty years experience and finance lessor when attention was not called to the
terms on the reverse side of the contract that created the finance lease and omitted the finance
lessor's identity).
116. See supra note 115.
117. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (2000).
118. Id. § 2-313.
119. Id. §2-601.
120. Id. § 2-609.
121. Id. § 2-513(1).
122. Id. § 2-513(3)(b).
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same results can be achieved under the 2003 Amendments to Article
2 by an agreement that INCOTERMS will govern the shipping
obligations and rights of the parties and by agreeing on the
appropriate term to achieve the desired effect.'
24
The seller can further limit the buyer's right of inspection by
obtaining an agreement on the scope, time, and place of
inspection. 12 5  Absent an agreement, the buyer may inspect "at any
reasonable place and time and in any reasonable manner."'
' 26
Pushing the envelope even further, the parties may contractually
limit or define the time within which the buyer must give notice of
the defects and the time within which to reject the goods. 127  Such
limitations set the standard for measuring the reasonableness of the
buyer's conduct and are enforceable unless the agreed to standard is
manifestly unreasonable. 1
28
Courts construing the term to determine whether it is
"manifestly unreasonable" seek to determine if the term or the
operation of a term strips one of the parties of a right or remedy that
was either bargained for,129 or granted by a default rule or standard
of a particular article.' 30  Described as a limitation on the right of
123. Id. § 2-513(3)(a).
124. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 53; U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (2003).
125. But see Plateq Corp. v. Machlett Labs., Inc., 456 A.2d 786, 789 (Conn. 1983) (holding
that a buyer did not have the right to inspect after installation of the goods).
126. U.C.C. § 2-513(1) (2000). U.C.C. § 2-513 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3), where goods are tendered or
delivered or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a right before payment or
acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place and time and in any reasonable
manner. When the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to the buyer, the
inspection may be after their arrival.
Id. (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. UCC section 1-302(b) reads as follows:
The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the
Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement. The parties, by
agreement, may determine the standards by which the performance of those obligations
is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Whenever [the
Uniform Commercial Code] requires an action to be taken within a reasonable time, a
time that is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
129. See, e.g., Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 244 N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (N.Y.
1968) (holding that the operation of a notice provision stripped the buyer of a remedy for defects
that were covered by an express warranty but were not discoverable until after the elapse of the
notice period).
130. See, eg., Morgan Bldgs. & Spas, Inc. v. Turn-Key Leasing, Ltd., 97 S.W.3d 871, 880
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parties to anticipate and allocate business risks, the construction
involves an assessment of the terms of the agreement not the process
of bargaining.' 3' The manifestly unreasonable test is deferentially
applied,132 without regard to inequity in bargaining strength. The
parameter of the test is the agreement itself, including by definition,
the relevant course of dealings, trade usage, and course of
performance of the parties.' 
33
The manifestly unreasonableness test assumes that the
agreement falls within the boundary set for conscionable conduct.'
34
Hence, the assumption is that the agreement is not subject to
invalidation by the doctrine of unconscionability because of
oppressive or inequitable dealing unless separately alleged.
Although a court may consider many of the same factors such as the
language of the terms, the circumstances existing at the time of
contracting, and the operation of the terms when addressing either
the manifestly unreasonableness test or unconscionability, the scope
of inquiry differs.' 35 Under the manifestly unreasonableness test, the
bargaining process is not an issue. The concerns that drive an
assessment of whether a bargain was procedurally unconscionable or
whether unfairness occurred in the bargaining process are
irrelevant. 36 The focus of the inquiry is whether the agreement has
abrogated a right or remedy that is guaranteed by either a default
provision or prior bargaining, or whether the agreement has merely
defined when that right has been satisfied. 37  If the agreement
(Tex. App. 2003) (holding that the terms of an amended joint venture agreement were manifestly
unreasonable because the terms deprived the buyer's right to advance notice as guaranteed by
U.C.C. Article 9).
131. See PPG Indus. v. Shell Oil Co., 919 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1990) (addressing whether a
force majeure clause that exempted non-performance for explosions within or beyond the control
of seller contravened U.C.C. § 1-102(c) duty of good faith and diligence).
132. See id. (stating that the manifesting unreasonableness standard is deferentially applied to
"contracts of such sophisticated parties as PPG and Shell"). But see Borowski v. Firstar Bank
Milwaukee, N.A., 579 N.W.2d 247, 251-53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a fourteen-day
notice period for customers to notify bank of unauthorized signature or alteration was not
manifestly unreasonable).
133. U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 1 (2001); see also Nat'l City Bank v. Plechaty Cos., 661 N.E.2d
227, 230 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding affidavits and oral evidence relevant and not excluded by
the parol evidence rule in examining the reasonableness of the agreement).
134. Hart Eng'g Co. v. FMC Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1471, 1480 (D.R.I. 1984).
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., Borowski, 579 N.W.2d at 250-53 (giving deference to the parties' agreement
despite unequal bargaining power between the parties).
137. Seesupra notes 129 and 130.
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merely establishes a standard for determining if a right granted by a
default provision or a bargained for term has been satisfied and the
effect of the standard does not abrogate the right or obligation, the
term is not manifestly unreasonable.
D. Minimizing the Seller's Responsibility
for the Quality of Its Performance
Complaining about the quality of seller's performance extends
to arbitrating 138 or litigating the dissatisfaction. Again, a seller may
effectively rob the buyer of this right by shortening the statute of
limitations to the permissible one-year limit, 139 by effectively
liquidating damages, 140 or by providing an exclusive remedy.
14 1
Damages, as measured by Code formulae, are not otherwise
available if the liquidated or limited remedy is enforceable.
142
1. Liquidating damages
Traditionally, the common law permitted liquidated damages as
a convenient method of providing a pre-estimate of the probable
lOSS. 143 If, at the time of contracting, the likely damages, by their
nature, were uncertain and difficult to determine and the amount
fixed was reasonably considered to be the actual, compensable loss
to be suffered in the event of breach, the term was deemed a
liquidated damages provision and not a penalty. 144  Courts
considered several factors in reaching their determination of the
reasonableness of the sum fixed. Did the parties: (1) intend to agree
on liquidated damages and not a penalty; (2) at contracting, was the
anticipated harm or injury caused by the breach difficult to ascertain,
uncertain, or difficult to prove; 145 and (3) was the stipulated sum a
138. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LoY. LA. L. REv.
187 (2006) (discussing the role of law and equity in arbitration decisions, and finding that
generally, arbitration is not used as a means of sidestepping the law).
139. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2000).
140. See id. § 2-718.
141. See id. § 2-719.
142. See id.; id. § 2-718.
143. See, e.g., Dave Gustafson & Co. v. S.D. State Highway Comm'n, 225 N.W.2d 594, 596-
97 (S.D. 1975).
144. See Phillips v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 594 S.W.2d 39, 41-42 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
145. See, e.g., id. (holding that liquidated damages are enforceable if the stipulated sum is a
reasonable forecast of just compensation for the injury and if the harm is difficult or incapable of
accurate estimation); Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 626 (Utah 1982) (holding that the amount
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reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss. 146  Despite the label
applied to the term, a stipulated sum failing to satisfy the
requirements was deemed a penalty and was unenforceable.
147
Consequently, the intent of the parties carried little if any weight in
determining the character of the provision. 148  Of significance was
the relative disparity between the pre-estimate and the actual harm
suffered.149 If the former was disproportionately large, the provision
was an unenforceable penalty.' 50 If the pre-estimate was inordinately
low, the court may have held the provision to be unconscionable.'15
The UCC authorizes and enforces the liquidation of damages if
the agreed-to sums are reasonable. 52 Reasonableness is determined
by considering: (1) the anticipated or actual harm, (2) the difficulty
of proof, and (3) the availability or adequacy of other remedies.
153
These three factors are viewed as a retention of the "uncertainty"
requirement of the common law.'
54
In stark contrast to UCC section 2-718, is Article 2A's
liquidated provision, section 2A-504. 55 Implementing Article 2A's
so fixed must be a "reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the
breach" and "the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of
accurate estimation").
146. Gaines v. Jones, 486 F.2d 39, 44 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying Missouri law, the court found
liquidated damages clause calling for payment of $75,000 upon discharge before fixed time in
employment contract was reasonable forecast of harm, where discharged employee told to expect
$50,000 to $60,000 in first year of employment); Sw. Eng'g Co. v. U.S., 341 F.2d 998, 1001-02
(8th Cir. 1965) (discussing liquidated damages providing for daily damages in the event of delay
beyond agreed completion date as reasonable forecast of harm in light of circumstances at the
time of contracting); McCarthy v. Tally, 297 P.2d 981, 987 (Cal. 1956) (finding liquidated
damages provision in lease agreement was not reasonable pre-estimate of harm); Guiliano v.
Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 98-99 (Tenn. 1999) (noting liquidated damages provision in an
employment contract providing for payment of current salary through the expiration of the
contract upon termination without cause was reasonable pre-estimate of harm at time of
contracting because it was within the contemplation of the parties that employee would not find
other work and might suffer loss of professional status and prestige); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY,
JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 125(B)(1) (4th ed. 2001); PERILLO, supra note 16, § 14.31.
147. MURRAY, JR., supra note 146, § 125(A)(1).
148. Id. § 125(B)(1)
149. Id.
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981).
151. Id. § 356 cmt. a.
152. U.C.C. § 2-718 (2000).
153. Id.
154. MURRAY, JR., supra note 146, § 125(c)(1).
155. U.C.C. § 2A-504 (2000).
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overriding goal of preserving the parties' freedom of contract,156
section 2A-504 is less restrictive than its analogue in Article 2.
Article 2A authorizes the parties to liquidate damages in an amount
or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the then anticipated
harm caused by the other's default, act or omission.1 57 If the agreed
to damage provision is unreasonable, remedial rights may be
exercised as provided by the Article's default provisions. 158
Unlike section 2-718, section 2A-504 lacks guidelines for
determining the reasonableness of contractual provisions. 159 Courts
and commentators have questioned the absence of guidelines.
Commentators seeking to resolve this issue posit that a provision is
reasonable "if it 'leaves [the lessor] in no better position than it
would be in had the lease been fully performed."",160 Commentators
have suggested that the term is reasonable if it "place[s] the lessor
roughly in the same position the lessor would have been in had the
first lease deal gone through."' 16 1 A mere difference between the
actual loss and the agreed to term, however, does not result in an
unreasonable term.
162
Unreasonable terms include those that permit a windfall as a
result of the breach, or a double recovery of some or all of the
anticipated benefits from the original lease. 163  Examples of
unreasonable terms include: a clause granting the lessor the right to
collect the present value of all future rent, plus the fair market value
of the equipment at the end of the lease, without crediting the lessee
for the proceeds of the sale of the goods;' 64 a formula permitting the
recovery of three times the lease payments due under the agreement
156. Id. § 2A-504 official cmt.
157. Id. § 2A-504(1).
158. Id. § 2A-504(2).
159. Compare id. § 2A-504, with U.C.C. § 2-718 (2000).
160. See ePlus Group, Inc. v. Panoramic Commc'ns, 50 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 213, 222
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (alteration in original) (citing Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. v. Meridian
Leasing Corp. (In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.), 269 BR. 1, 9 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001));
see also Coastal Leasing Corp. v. T-Bar S Corp., 496 S.E.2d 795, 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that a liquidated damages clause was reasonable because it placed the "plaintiff in the
position it would have occupied had the lease been fully performed").
161. 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 97, § 14-3.
162. ePlus Group, Inc., 50 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 222 (citing Coastal Leasing Corp., 496
S.E.2d at 798).
163. Id. at 224-25.
164. Carter v. Tokai Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 S.E.2d 638, 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
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(Casualty Value) and only permitting a credit for proceeds from the
sale or re-lease of the goods to the extent the proceeds exceed the
Casualty Value of the goods;1 65 a provision allowing a lessor to
recover more than double the amount it would have than if the lease
had been fully performed;' 66 an acceleration clause failing to
discount to present-value;' 67 a right to earned interest on early rent
payments that was otherwise unavailable to the lessor without a
default; 168 and a clause in an automobile lease requiring payment of
an amount equal to one monthly lease payment in addition to an
amount imposed by other provisions of the liquidated damages
clause.
169
a. Anticipated harm, actual harm or both?
The Article 2 standard for liquidated damages deviates from its
precursor at common law. At common law, the liquidated damages
term served as a reasonable forecast or pre-estimate of the probable
actual loss.' 70 Unlike at common law, the Article 2 standard permits
a determination of the reasonableness of the term in relationship to
the anticipated or actual loss sustained. 171
With the promulgation of Article 2 and the Restatement, the
underlying policy goals sought to be achieved by permitting the
liquidation of damages shifted from merely pre-estimating probable
loss when damages were unascertainable or uncertain to that of
promoting efficiency by conserving judicial resources, the time
invested by courts, juries, and witnesses in determining damages, and
minimizing litigation expenses. 172  Permitting parties to agree to
reasonable compensation facilitated this shift in policy and
maintained the prohibition against penalties.' 73 Consequently, both
the Restatement and Article 2 permit a liquidated damages provision
165. See ePlus Group, Inc., 50 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) at 222-23.
166. Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. v. Meridian Leasing Corp. (In re Montgomery Ward
Holding Corp.), 269 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001), affd, 326 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2003).
167. Frontier Leasing Corp. v. Griffin Petroleum Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1176 (S.D. Iowa
2001), aff'd, 36 F. App'x. 223 (8th Cir. 2002).
168. Id.
169. Sun v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., 562 S.E.2d 714, 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
170. MURRAY, JR., supra note 146.
171. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2000).
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (1981).
173. See id. § 356; see also MURRAY, JR., supra note 146, § 125(c)(1).
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to be enforced if the stipulated damages or formula result in
compensation that is reasonable in light of either the anticipated loss
or the actual lOSS. 174 Although a term might be unreasonable in light
of the anticipated loss, the provision is saved if, notwithstanding the
unreasonableness of the term at contracting, it is reasonable in
relation to the actual loss. 175 Those courts that require that the term
be reasonable in view of both the anticipated harm and the actual
harm deviate from the mandate of the statute. 176 Under these two
regimes, the enforceability of liquidated damage provisions has been
enlarged. To avoid unnecessary litigation, the reasonableness of the
liquidated damages term is generally presumed. 177 The complaining
party, the one seeking to nullify the enforceability of the term, has
the burden of proving that the term is unreasonable. 1
78
Unlike Article 2, Article 2A, under current construction, harkens
back to the common law. The term must be reasonable in view of
the anticipated harm or injury. 179
b. Liquidated damages &
the absence of harm resulting from the breach
If an agreed upon provision is reasonable in view of anticipated
harm but no harm actually occurs as a result of the breach, should the
term be enforced? Courts addressing this issue are confronted with
the task of determining whether the statue imposes the testing of the
provision prospectively, at the time of contracting, or retrospectively,
at trial; 180 whether to place a premium on risk assessment and
allocation by the parties or favor judicial allocation of risk and
resolution of the degree of compensation for the harm incurred
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356; U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
175. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.
176. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356.
177. See PERILLO, supra note 16, at § 14.3 1(c).
178. See id. See generally Allen v. Smith, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting
that a liquidated damage clause is usually valid unless shown by challenging party to be
unreasonable) (citing Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 953 P.2d 484, 487 (Cal. 1998)).
179. See U.C.C. § 2A-504(l) (2000).
180. Watson v. Ingram, 881 P.2d 247, 249-50 (Wash. 1994) (holding that prospective
determination of the reasonableness of a liquidated damages term rather than a retrospective
assessment light of actual damages suffers implements the purposes of liquidated damages
clauses, gives effect to risk allocation by the parties, and encourages efficient resolution of any
breach).
Fall 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:401
including consequential damages;' 8 1 and, as some have suggested,
and whether to follow "the policy in favor of enforcing legitimate
agreed damages provisions [or] the more fundamental policy which
precludes windfall."' 82  In resolving these questions, the courts are
not in agreement.' 83 Article 2 delineates the determination of
reasonableness and provides an objective basis for enforcing the
intent of the parties if the term is reasonable in view of the
anticipated loss at the time of contracting. 184  If at the time of
contracting, the liquidated damages term is reasonable in light of
anticipated harm, a failure to enforce the term results in a loss of the
benefit sought to be achieved, not only for the parties but also the
public, and a loss of transaction costs incurred to reach an agreement
on the term. If a liquidated damages provision that is reasonable in
view of anticipated loss is deemed unenforceable as a penalty if no
actual loss occurs, reasonable parties are unlikely to invest time and
other resources ex ante to craft a liquidated damages provision only
to have their determination nullified ex post. Indeed, such a
prevailing view only encourages litigation, negates the benefits
section 2-718 was designed to provide, and frustrates the
expectations of the parties. 85
Article 2A permits the recovery of liquidated damages that are
reasonable in light of anticipated harm when the agreement was
entered. Article 2A omits the alternative basis that is provided in
Article 2, thereby avoiding the confusion that the alternative has
generated.
181. Cal. & Haw. Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to substitute the court's judgment for that of the parties and enforced the stipulated
liquidated damages sum of $17,000 per day that was reasonable at contracting although the
stipulated sum substantially exceeded the actual loss incurred from seller's breach of its promise
to deliver a tug boat and barge).
182. MURRAY, JR., supra note 146, § 125(c)(2) (emphasis omitted).
183. See, e.g., Cal. & Haw. Sugar Co., 794 F.2d at 1439; Grand Bissell Towers, Inc. v. John
Gagnon Enters., 657 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that because of the absence
of actual damages, liquidated damages provision was unenforceable in an action for breach of a
lease of commercial real property); Watson, 881 P.2d at 249-50; Fields Found. v. Christensen,
309 N.W.2d 125, 131 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a liquidated damages provision is a
penalty is no actual harm results from the breach).
184. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2000). See, e.g., Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 94 A. 665, 667
(Conn. 1914) ("the standard of measure is not furnished by plaintiff's actual loss.., but by the
loss or injury which might reasonably have been anticipated at the time the contract was made").
185. Watson, 881 P.2d at 851-55.
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2. Liquidated damages as an exclusive or
limited remedy: Article 2A & 2 contrasted
By extracting an agreement for an exclusive limited remedy, the
seller further restricts the buyer's response for its failure.1 86  Rather
than receive damages or equitable relief, a buyer might agree to:
accept replacement or repair of the goods;' 87 return the goods and
receive repayment of the purchase price;1 88 accept a right to insist
that the seller to buy-back the goods;' 89 or adjust the price based on
trade usage. Without the designation of "exclusive," any limited
remedy is deemed optional. 191 Despite the terms of section 2-719,
authorities have held that exclusivity may arise from a reasonable
construction of the agreement 192 and trade usage, 193 which is an
186. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (2000).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., Kelley Metal Trading Co. v. Al-Jon/United, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 185, 189-90 (D.
Kan. 1993).
190. See, e.g., N. Am. Steel Corp. v. Siderius, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 899, 904-05 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977).
191. UCC Section 2-719(1) reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the preceding
section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those
provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable
under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts;
and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to
be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-719 (2000) (emphasis added).
192. CogniTest Corp. v. Riverside Publ'g Co., 107 F.3d 493, 498 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying
Illinois law and holding that a limited remedy provision does not need to employ the word
"exclusive" if reasonable construction of the contract indicates that the parties intended a limited
remedy to be exclusive). But see Gaynor Elec. Co. v. Hollander, 618 A.2d 532, 534-36 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1993) (discussing a commercial transaction for the sale of switches to be used in the
manufacture of heated handlebars; the seller's form stated that seller's liability "shall not exceed
the cost of correcting defects in the goods" did not create an exclusive remedy).
193. See, e.g., Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 190 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir.
1999) (applying South Carolina law, the court held that usage of trade under the UCC
supplemented an agreement and imposed an exclusive remedy of repair, replacement, or return);
W. Indus. Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying
Wisconsin law, the court rejected the contention that trade custom cannot limit liability because
Section 2-719(1)(b) provides that resort to a remedy is optional unless expressly agreed to be
exclusive); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758, 765-66 (10th Cir. 1983)
(applying Kansas law, the court held that usage of trade may add an exclusive remedy to an
agreement); Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying
Pennsylvania law, the court held that the agreement includes trade usage or an expressed term
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implied term in every agreement. 194 Likewise, course of dealings,
another implied term in every agreement,' 95 should provide an
exclusive remedial right in those jurisdictions that recognize trade
usage as a source of an exclusive remedy.'
96
An Article 2A liquidated damages provision may also be an
exclusive remedy or a limited remedy.197 If it is not only a liquidated
damages provision but also an exclusive or limited remedy, all
default remedies are available if, because of circumstances, the
provision fails of its essential purpose. 198  Of concern is whether
courts will mistakenly treat all liquidated damages terms as optional
if the parties do not expressly provide that the provision is exclusive,
even though the term is not intended as a "limited remedy." This is
especially a concern in those jurisdictions that require limited
remedies to be expressly delineated as exclusive.
Article 2, section 2-719 provides that the limitation of remedial
rights by parties may be exclusive, but is subject to the prior
liquidated damages provision. 199 This language suggests that parties
who liquidate their damages are not otherwise subject to the
restrictions of section 2-719. These restrictions include either:
identifying the remedy as exclusive or satisfying the failure of the
essential purpose test.20 0  If reasonable, a liquidated damages
provision is not vulnerable to attack for failing of the essential
purpose of providing conforming goods within a reasonable time.
20 1
Additionally, to prevent the term from being treated as optional to
other statutorily provided damage relief it is unnecessary to identify
the liquidated damages provision as exclusive.
2 02
that the limited remedy is an exclusive one).
194. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(3), 1-303 (2001).
195. See id. §§ 1-201(b)(3), 1-303.
196. See id. § 1-303.
197. U.C.C. § 2A-504(2) (2000).
198. Id.
199. U.C.C. § 2-719 (2000).
200. See id. But see Cognitest Corp. v. Riverside Publ'g Co., 107 F.3d 493, 496-99 (7th Cir.
1997) (testing the liquidated damages provision in this agreement for the distribution of a
psychological-software program designed for use by psychiatrists and other mental health
professionals under the Section 2-719 "minimum adequate remedy" test and also holding that
under Illinois law the provision operated as an exclusive remedy based on the reasonable
construction of the contract, not, the inclusion of the term "exclusive").
201. U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (2000).
202. Id. § 2-719 cmt. 2.
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Indeed, the nature of the liquidated damages term further
suggests that it is solely applicable on the issue of damages without
the addition of exclusivity language.20 3 The 2003 Amendments to
section 2A-504 reinforce this conclusion by establishing that section
2A-503 is only applicable to terms that limit but do not liquidate
damages. 204  Certainly, parties may provide that a liquidated
damages term is an exclusive remedy.20 5 The benefit that accrues
from such a characterization is the exclusion of equitable relief for
the seller's failure to perform as promised.20 6 Should the injured
party seek specific performance, injunctive relief, replevy, or quasi-
contactual relief, the party should be denied such relief if the
agreement expressly or impliedly, through course of dealings or trade
usage, provides that liquidated damages are the exclusive remedy.20 7
Without exclusivity, equitable relief may be available
notwithstanding the liquidated damages term.
20 8
IV. POLICING THE SELLER'S MARGINALIZATION
OF BUYER'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY.
A. The Essential Purpose Test
As discussed in Part II, the seller may effectively minimize its
obligation of performance though the use of disclaimers, agreed-
upon standards for determining when Code norms are satisfied, and
merger clauses. To the degree that the seller obligates itself, even if
limited to the responsibility of delivering the goods, the buyer is
203. See, e.g., Design Time, Inc. v. Monco of Orlando, Inc., 518 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the court "may not award damages in excess of that [liquidated]
suM",).
204. UCC section 2A-504 reads as follows:
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other act or omission, including
indemnity for loss or diminution of anticipated tax benefits or loss or damage to
lessor's residual interest, may be liquidated in the lease agreement but only at an
amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm caused
by the default or other act or omission. Section 2A-503 determines the enforceability of
a term that limits but does not liquidate damages.
U.C.C. § 2A-504 (2000) (emphasis added).
205. See id. § 2A-503(2).
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
Fall 20061
432 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:401
guaranteed remedial rights. 20 9  Although these remedial rights are
subject to limitation, the limited remedial rights granted must result
in a "fair quantum of remedy," for breach of the obligations
undertaken. 210  This "fair quantum of remedy" must not fail of its
211essential purpose. If "an apparently fair and reasonable clause
because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive
either party of the substantial value of the bargain, 212 it must be
expunged from the agreement.213 If the agreement does not provide
a "fair quantum of remedy" or the remedy fails of its essential
purpose, the full panoply of Article 2 remedies becomes available.
214
Generally, one of two prevailing approaches is employed to
determine whether a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose.
Under the first approach, if the limited remedy, such as repair or
replacement of the goods, is unsuccessful or not undertaken, the
injured party is deemed deprived of the substantial value of the
bargain, and the remedy has failed of its essential purpose. 2 15 As a
result, all Code remedies become available.216 For the buyer to
209. See generally U.C.C. § 2-711 (2000) (discussing a buyer's remedies).
210. Id. §2-719cmt. 1.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 190 F.3d 252, 257 (4th Cir. 1999);
see also Riegel Power Corp. v. Voith Hydro, 888 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
remedy fails of its essential purpose if the seller refuses to make repairs or cannot repair the
product); RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a repair
or replace remedy failed of its essential purpose because the defendant was either unwilling or
unable to provide a system that worked as represented, or to fix the 'bugs' in the software);
Chatlos Sys. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085 (3rd Cir. 1980) (holding that an
exclusive remedy fails of its purpose when the warrantor fails to correct the defect within a
reasonable period); AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 939-40 (7th Cir.
1978) (applying Illinois law, the court held that a remedy failed its essential purpose when the
buyer "experienced trouble with the Laser almost from the beginning, and repeated efforts by
[seller] were unsuccessful in bringing the Laser to warranted specifications for other than short
periods of time"); Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 826, 833
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that the exclusive repair and replace remedy failed of its essential
purpose when the licensor refused to repair or replace the software); John Deere Co. v. Hand, 319
N.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Neb. 1982) (holding that a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose if
"the seller is given a reasonable chance to correct defects and the equipment still fails to function
properly"); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 564 A.2d 919, 929 (Pa.
1989) (holding that a remedy fails of its essential purpose if the seller is unable to put the goods
in the condition warranted because of negligence in repairing the goods or the goods are beyond
repair).
216. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2000).
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receive the substantial benefit of its bargain, the seller must be both
willing and able to provide goods that substantially comply with the
contract terms within a reasonable amount of time.217
The second approach involves the construction of the
agreement. In light of the transaction type and circumstances, the
court attempts to glean the intent of the parties and determine the
scope and purpose of the limited remedy for which they bargained.2 18
If the breach is one within the scope of the parties' initial
expectations, the seller's compliance or non-compliance with the
terms of the limited remedy determines whether the remedy fails.
2 19
If the harm resulting from the breach of the obligation undertaken
was not within the contemplation of the parties, the limited remedy is
unavailable as consistent with the intent of the parties, and the buyer
bears the loss as the parties intended at contracting. 22° The non-
breaching party has a fair quantum of remedy for the obligation
undertaken and has agreed to substitute this quantum for damages
that would otherwise be available. 22 1  The remedy is effectual,
fulfilling its purpose. However, this outcome is subject to the
general prohibition against unconscionable terms pursuant to section
2_302.222
Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc.,223 is often cited as
an example of the second approach. In Coastal, the buyer received a
copy of the seller's brochure and agreed to purchase panels needed
217. Jonathan A. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics
of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REV. 28, 38 (1977).
218. See id. at 33.
219. See Patapsco Designs, Inc. v. Dominion Wireless, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 472, 475-76 (D.
Md. 2003); see also Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (4th Cir.
1980) (holding that the alternative limited remedy of cost of replacement or replace or repair
failed of its essential purpose because the parties envisioned the replacement of defective panel
before installation; consequently, discovery of latent defects after installation required the buyer
to bear the cost of removing and installing replacement panels an expense to which a party with
equal bargaining power would not agree); Dowty Commc'ns Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys.
Corp., 817 F. Supp. 581, 585-86 (D. Md. 1992) (distinguishing the two approaches and holding
the limited remedy did not fail of its essential purpose).
220. Eddy, supra note 217, at 38-40.
221. Seeid.at38.
222. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2000); see also Constr. Assocs. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d
237, 241 (N.D. 1989) (noting that the goal of Section 2-302 is to prevent oppression and unfair
surprise); LARY LAWRENCE, 4B LAWRENCE'S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-719:5 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the rationale behind section 2-719 and the restrain on the
freedom of contract so as to prevent an unconscionable result).
223. 635 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1980).
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for performance of its contract with the United States Navy.224 In its
brochure, the seller warranted that the panels would maintain their
original characteristics during the life of the original installation and
agreed, at its election, to either refinish or repair the panels, or pay
for the cost of replacement for each defective panel. 25 Within
several months after the Navy accepted the work, the Navy
complained that the panels were defective.226 The buyer demanded
that the seller replace or repair the defective panels. The seller
refused and the buyer sued.2 2' The court determined that the purpose
of the limited remedy was to provide for the replacement of defective
228 ltnpanels before installation. The latent defects were only discovered
after installation.229 The court concluded the remedy failed of its
essential purpose, replacement before installation, and therefore, the
buyer could resort to any remedy.
230
The court's conclusion in this case is odd. If the purpose of the
remedy was to provide recovery for defects occurring before and not
after installation, the logical assumption is that the parties agreed that
the buyer would bear responsibility for all other risks, including
defects discovered after installation. Indeed, the purpose of the
remedy was effectuated; it did not fail. The seller insulated itself
from liability. But, this is not what the court appears to have meant
by the phrase "before installation." Rather, the Court believed that
the seller warranted the goods free from defects, patent and latent,
regardless of the time of discovery. 23 1  The limited remedy of
replacement partially failed because the defects were not discovered
before installation.232 Absent clear proof, the court was convinced
that the parties did not agree to allocate the risk of undiscoverable,
latent defects to the buyer because the seller warranted the goods free
of all defects, patent and latent.
233
224. Id. at 1103.
225. Id. at 1103-04.
226. Id. at 1104.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1106-07.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1107.
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The court said:
It is difficult to believe that a buyer in an equal bargaining
position would accede to accepting such liability for a
flatent] defect caused by the seller. In the absence of clear
intention, we cannot interpret an agreement as creating such
a partial remedy.
Coastal [buyer] and Laminators [seller] could have
specifically agreed to limit consequential damages, but they
did not. Section 2-719(3) provides that "consequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation
or exclusion is unconscionable.". . . Had Laminators'
warranty specifically limited consequential damages,
Coastal could have only received its costs of the material
even though that represented partial failure of the essential
purpose of the warranty. It seems unlikely that a buyer
would agree to such a limitation in the circumstances of this
case, but a conscious acceptance of such an agreement
would bind him even in the face of a partial failure of the
essential purpose of the remedy unless the limitations [of
consequential damages] were unconscionable.234
An assessment of the court's language suggests that the court
was concerned that the limited remedy was unconscionable.235 The
court seemingly disbelieved that the buyer would accept, or
knowingly assent to, liability for latent defects.236 However, the
buyer's equal bargaining position appears to have inhibited a
conclusion that the limited remedy was unconscionable.237 The court
believes that the buyer was unfairly surprised by the results, given
the express warranty of freedom from defects and the loss to be
borne by the buyer for the seller's defective performance.238
Other courts have not permitted the commercial nature of the
parties to abrogate the availability of unconscionability as a policing
tool if disparity of bargaining power is present and pre-printed, un-
bargained for terms are not called to the other's attention.2 39 For
234. Id. (emphasis added).
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Un-bargained for terms are those not based upon trade usage or prior course of dealings.
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these courts, the resulting unfair surprise satisfies the procedural
prong of the unconscionability test.2 40 Nonetheless, the Court in
Coastal correctly recognized, in the first instance, that the parties'
purpose in agreeing to the limited remedy had to be ascertained
before assessing whether the remedy failed of its essential
purpose. 24 1  If the purposes and goals of the bargain are met, the
second issue is whether the term is unconscionable.242
Given the "general skepticism" of unconscionability claims in
commercial transactions and the reluctance "to find
unconscionability in purely commercial settings,' ' z43 courts may
employ the "deprived of a substantial benefit of the bargain" test as
an indirect means of holding the term unenforceable. 44 Such
indirect approaches should be avoided. If the buyer lacked the
opportunity to negotiate the term or to knowingly assent to the term,
regardless of its commercial character, section 2-302's policy of
preventing unfair surprise would be triggered.245  With the
opportunity to read and assess the effect of the limited remedy on
both patent and latent defects, the knowing assumption of risk makes
the provision procedurally effective.
2 46
However, even assuming that the limited remedy fails of its
essential purpose or is held unconscionable, the court must determine
the impact of such a holding on the exclusion or limitation of
See, e.g., Constr. Assocs. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d 237, 242 (N.D. 1989) (holding
that the limited remedy of replacement was unconscionable where the buyer was a small
construction firm and the seller was an "enormous, highly diversified, international
conglomerate" and the term was part of the installation instructions delivered with the goods to
the installation site and was neither actually negotiated or called to the buyer's attention resulting
in unfair surprise. The court's focus should have been directed to whether the limited remedial
term was, indeed, a part of the agreement under Section 2-207 when only packaged with the
goods as part of the installation instructions).
240. Id.
241. See Coastal Modular Corp., 635 F.2d at 1107.
242. Id. at 1107.
243. Constr. Assocs., 446 N.W.2d at 242 (citing A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 124 (Ct. App. 1982).
244. See generally Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696, 700 (S.D. 1982) (holding
that a farmer's loss of crops from an ineffective herbicide deprived the farmer of a substantial
benefit since it was not in a position to bargain with a chemical manufacturer); HAWKLAND &
MILLER, supra note 102, § 2A-503:02 n.5 (citing Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 679
S.W.2d 814, 818-19 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984)) (discussing where an exclusive remedy deprives a
party of a substantial benefit of the bargain).
245. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2000).
246. See Eddy, supra note 217, at 42-44.
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consequential damages. The modem trend in cases construing the
relationship between the failure of an exclusive remedy and its
limitation of consequential damages holds that the two clauses are
independent.247 The infirmity of one does not affect the other.248
Construing section 2-719 as creating provisions that operate
independently implements the strong public policy of freedom of
contracting as required by Revised section 1-302.249 The parties may
abrogate this effect by express agreement, but such an agreement
should state an intent to change the independent nature of the
exclusive limited remedy and the limitation of consequential
damages.25 0 The exclusion of consequential damages must not be
unconscionable.251  Even though independent, the exclusion of
247. McNally Wellman Co. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1197 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting, "a limitation on incidental or consequential damages remains valid even if an
exclusive remedy fails"); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086
(3rd Cir. 1980) (stating, "[i]t appears to us that the better reasoned approach is to treat the
consequential damage disclaimer as an independent provision, valid unless unconscionable");
Patapsco Designs, Inc. v. Dominion Wireless, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 472, 476 (D. Md. 2003)
(holding that the effect of the two provisions did not make the limitation ambiguous; the facts
were insufficient to resolve whether the limited remedy failed of its essential purpose, and,
assuming it failed, only the test of unconscionability was applicable under the court's projection
of Maryland's resolution of the issue); Eastman Chem. Co. v. Niro, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 712,
720-21 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Ritchie Enters. v. Honeywell Bull, Inc. 730 F. Supp. 1041, 1047 (D.
Kan. 1990) (stating, "[w]hen a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, 2-719(2) abrogates
only the remedy limitation and not the warranty disclaimers"); In re Aureal, 279 B.R. at 583-84
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (applying California law and stating in dicta that UCC Section 2-700's
damage remedies are not consequential damages within Section 2-719(3)); Canal Elec. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Mass. 1990) (stating, "[w]e conclude that the
disclaimer of consequential damages is enforceable even though the limited repair or replacement
remedy has failed of its essential purpose"); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co.,
527 A.2d 429, 437 (N.J. 1987) (stating, "[w]e are also persuaded that many routine business
transactions would be dislocated by a rule requiring the invalidation of a consequential damage
exclusion whenever the prescribed contractual remedy fails to operate as intended"); Schurtz v.
BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112-14 (Utah 1991) (concluding that the plain language
of U.C.C. provisions, the associated Official Comments, and policy considerations support
interpreting the clauses as independent). But see, e.g., Great Dane Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern
Pulpwood, Inc., 785 S.W.2d 13, 17-18 (Ark. 1990) (noting that upon failure of the limited
remedy's essential purpose, the buyer's remedies provided by the Code, including consequential
damages, are recoverable); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696, 700-01 (S.D. 1982)
(holding that a warranty and limitation of consequential damages in an agreement between a
herbicide manufacturer and farmers who lack bargaining position to extract more favorable terms
or to test the effectiveness of the product before purchasing was unconscionable).
248. See sources cited supra note 247.
249. See U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001).
250. For a discussion of unconscionability as a tool for policing an exclusive remedy, see
supra text accompanying notes 107-116.
251. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2000).
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consequential damages will be unenforceable if unconscionable.252
At least one court barred the enforceability of the exclusion because
of the seller's bad faith.253
B. Good Faith Performance
Code reflects an assumption that parties, as a general rule, invest
minimal effort and resources in forming contractual relationships and
facilitates such conduct by providing gap fillers to supplement the
bargain of the parties. Commentators suggest that this approach to
contracting is a by-product of the perceived inefficiency of detailed
254planning and negotiating. Concomitantly, parties "rely on the
good faith of their exchange partners" to perform consistently with
reasonable commercial standards. 255  Section 1-304 of Revised
Article 1 imposes, as its predecessor, 256 "an obligation of good faith"
in the performance and enforcement of every contract or duty within
the Code's ambit.25 7  To the extent that a seller undertakes
obligations of performance as part of the contractual relationship, the
seller must in good faith perform the express obligations undertaken,
the implied terms from course of dealing, trade usage, and course of
performance, applicable suppletive gap-filling default rules, and
statutory duties. 2 58  No independent duty of good faith, such as
252. Id. § 2-302.
253. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin., 833 F. Supp. 962, 989-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that "[a] defendant may be estopped from asserting a contractual
limitation of consequential damages if the defendant has acted in bad faith" (quoting Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1442, 1457-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that a conscionable exclusion of consequential damages may only be circumvented upon
a showing that the defendant's conduct bars it from invoking the shield of the damage
limitation))).
254. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 371 (1980); see Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party
Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1223, 1267 (1999).
255. Burton, supra note 254, at 371.
256. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2000).
257. U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (2001); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981) (restating this general principal as applicable to contracts not within the scope of an article
of the UCC); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 668 (1963) (distinguishing good
faith purchase and good faith performance).
258. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001); see Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 588-89
(N.J. 1997) (supplementing former Article l's honesty in fact good faith standard with the
common law implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to find that the buyer breached its
duty of good faith performance by failing to purchase the agreed quantity of clam meat, in
refusing to honor the contract, and in exercising its right to terminate the agreement); Southface
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fairness or reasonableness, is implied by section 1-304. 2" Rather,
section 1-304 implies and imposes a duty to perform the required
obligations consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties
at the time of contracting. The purpose of this duty is to avoid
conduct constituting the recapture of a foregone opportunity or the
exercise of a contractual right in a manner that evades the spirit of
the transaction. 60
Although an implied obligation, the duty may not be eliminated
by agreement. Both Revised and former Article 1 expressly prohibit
disclaiming the obligation to perform or enforce contractual duties in
good faith.261  The parties may, however, establish standards
delineating the conduct or requirements for satisfying the good faith
obligation, unless the agreed standard is manifestly unreasonable.
262
Without an agreed to standard established by the parties for
determining whether the obligation of good faith has been fulfilled,
courts should employ the definitional standard imposed by the
Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Southface Condo. Ass'n, 733 A.2d 55, 58 (Vt. 1999) (each party to a
contract impliedly promises that each will not do anything to undermine or destroy the other's
rights to receive the benefits of the agreement). But see Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Pennsylvania law would not
recognize an independent cause of action for breach of an implied duty of good faith if the
allegations of bad faith are identical to another claim for relief). See generally Richard E.
Speidel, The "Duty" of Good Faith in Contract Performance and Enforcement, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 537, 544-45 (1996) (positing that a failure to adhere to a developed course of performance
constitutes bad faith).
259. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, COMMENTARY NO. 10-§ 1-203 (1994);
see, e.g., Aisenberg v. Hallmark Mktg. Corp., 337 F. Supp. 2d 257, 262 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing
Section 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts in a non-goods transaction and holding that
the plaintiff must establish that the defendant exercised a contractual right in a manner that evades
the spirit of the transaction or denies the plaintiff the benefit of the contract); see Harry Flechtner,
Comparing the General Good Faith Provisions of the PECL and the UCC: Appearance and
Reality, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 295, 307-11 (2001) (comparing the role of good faith in the UCC
with that in the Principles of European Contract Law). See generally Autry Petroleum Co. v. BP
Prods. N. Am., Inc., 59 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 468, 471 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (stating the
general rule).
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). See generally Burton, supra
note 254 (providing a top ten list of things that professors should know about the duty of good
faith in contracts); Speidel, supra note 258 (arguing that the expectation interest encompasses
opportunity cost and that "[t]his cost perspective makes it possible to articulate an operational
standard of good faith performance, which is now an implained covenant in every contract in
most American jursidictions"); Van Alstine, supra note 254 (arguing that the new textualist
approach to statutory interpretation misapprehends the role of good faith in contractual
relationships).
261. U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2001); see also U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2000).
262. For a discussion of the manifest unreasonableness standard, see supra notes 128-137 and
accompanying text.
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specific substantive Article. Revised Article 1 establishes the
standard for all Articles excluding Article 5.263 Parties must perform
contracts and duties and enforce contracts and rights honestly=and
adhere to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.264 This
standard broadens the prior merchant standard of unamended Article
2 by removing the limitation that the commercial standards of fair
dealing must only conform to those of the relevant trade.265 Now,
prevailing community standards of fair dealing should be
applicable.
266
Assume a seller effectively disclaims all implied warranties and
only makes an express warranty of description based on the identity
of the product agreed to be sold.267 Without a course of dealings or a
modification or waiver occurring through the course of performance
that creates an obligation of performance, the buyer only has a right
to obtain the product that the seller may have sold "as is." The buyer
gets what the seller has, no more. However, the buyer may have
unspoken expectations that remain unfulfilled. Such expectations
may result from the price to be paid, the seller's reputation, or the
buyer's own needs. None of these expectations, without more, result
in a duty of fairness or impose a duty of reasonable performance.268
A buyer's expectation resulting from the price to be paid is best
described as an assumption that the goods will conform to qualities
and standards of performance exemplified in goods offered by others
at a similar price. The seller's effective use of disclaimers of implied
warranties negates the duty to meet the prevailing standards for the
goods sold. Likewise, an expectation created by the seller's
reputation is only controlled by the seller's desire to preserve that
reputation in the marketplace or a self-imposed moral duty of
treating others fairly. The law only insists that the seller
263. But see Sons of Thunder, 690 A.2d at 587 (applying the Article I standard and
supplementing in with the common law definition of good faith rather than applying the merchant
standard of Article 2 for this goods transaction).
264. See U.C.C. § 1-304 official cmt. 1 (2001).
265. See U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (2000).
266. See generally Speidel, supra note 258 (arguing that refusal by one party to negotiate in
good faith is bad faith).
267. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b) (2000).
268. See, e.g., Goldman v. Barnett, 793 F. Supp. 28, 32 (D. Mass. 1992) (applying
Massachusetts law and stating in dictum that the seller has no duty to set a fair price); Rawson v.
Conover, 20 P.3d 876, 886 (Utah 2001).
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conspicuously indicate that it is not agreeing to perform consistent
with prevailing standards.269 Similarly, without agreeing to meet
buyer's needs, expressly or impliedly by warranting that the goods
will satisfy the buyer's objective for acquiring the goods, the seller is
not required by law to tender goods that satisfy the buyer's
objectives.270 This is true despite the language of Comment 3 to
section 2-715 that imposes liability for consequential losses resulting
from the general needs of the buyer. This language does not impose
a general duty on the seller to be responsible for meeting the buyer's
needs. Rather, the court imposes damages on the seller because of its
breach of the duties undertaken, such as a commitment to deliver by
a specified date, or an express or implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, which produces foreseeable losses because of the
general or particular needs known by the seller at the time of
contracting. 27 1  No obligation to meet general needs without an
express or implied undertaking exists in contract.
Finally, if the seller knows of the buyer's particular need for
goods, a court may determine that the seller's conduct constitutes
actionable fraud. Perhaps, if the requirements of intentional or negli-
gent misrepresentation, or material concealment or nondisclosure are
established, a buyer may have a cause of action for a seller's failure
to meet the buyer's need. Only the policing tools of uncon-
scionability or penalties imposed for violating state or federal regula-
tory standards are available to address the three defeated expecta-
tions experienced by the buyer. The duty of good faith performance
and enforcement does not provide a control over the seller's attempt
to minimize its obligation of performance.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Code recognizes freedom of contracting and
269. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2001).
270. See, e.g., Rawson, 20 P.3d at 887 (holding that the buyer failed to establish conduct
constituting negligent or intentional misrepresentation when the buyer purchased a salvaged used
van that had been restored by the seller and that had prior defects that had not been repaired
making the van unsafe for use by the buyer's family. The buyer testified that no warranties had
been made and the written agreement effectively disclaimed all implied warranties and excluded
the admissibility of express warranties).
271. "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include any loss resulting
from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting
had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise ......
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
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provides mechanisms for limiting and minimizing the seller's obliga-
tion of performance and responsibility for its defective performance,
Code norms mandate conscionable terms and a fair quantum of a
remedy for obligations undertaken. These norms function as controls
over the seller's ability to minimize its obligation and responsibility
for the obligations undertaken.
